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Jeffrey KAHN
In the spring of 1995, Oxford University was
just beginning to give final examinations to
the first students to undertake tutorials in a
course titled “Soviet and Post-Soviet State and
Law.” Soviet law had been studied for decades
at Oxford, but post-Soviet law was new and attracted only a trickle of students. They studied under the extraordinary Professor Bernard
Rudden of Brasenose College. At the examination, copies were provided of the then-brand
new 1993 Constitution, part I of the Civil
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Code, and Professor Butler’s collection of Basic
Legal Documents.
Oxford examinations take the form of writing several essays from a list of topics. Here is
one of the most important of the topics offered: “‘The new Constitution of the Russian
Federation has achieved neither separation
of powers nor a balance of powers.’ Discuss.”
Students would have understood that coded
language to ask for descriptive and normative
evaluations of both horizontal power structures; that is, between branches of the federal
government, and vertical power structures, between federal and regional governments. What
would a good answer have looked like in the
spring of 1995?
Well, any able student could identify a variety of hortatory and prescriptive provisions
in the text of the Constitution, some scattered
legislation, and a few judicial opinions. The
better students might have concluded that, on
its face, the Constitution’s super-presidential
system did not seem to separate or balance
power particularly well in either a horizontal
or a vertical direction. Dangers lurked in ambivalent language and yet-to-be-used levers of
power. But, the very best student would have
continued. She would have observed that the
question asked what had been achieved, not what
the mere text of the new Constitution had described. Her essay would have included an assessment of the effects on federalism and the separation of powers of an emerging party system,
a history of regional claims to sovereignty and
autonomy, and the de facto weakness of federal
power in the mid-1990s to demand blood and
treasure from regional powers like Mintimer
Shaimiyev in Tatarstan, Murtaza Rakhimov in
Bashkortostan, or Mikhail Nikolaev in SakhaYakutia, not to mention the then ongoing first
war in Chechnya.
This student would not have begun her
analysis on December 12, 1993, when the
Constitution was ratified under dubious conditions, but rather on August 10, 1990, when
Boris Yeltsin, then Chairman of the RSFSR
Supreme Soviet, addressed political elites in
Kazan’ and urged them to “take as much independence as you can hold on to,” words repeated a few days later in Ufa with the more

popular variant, “take all the sovereignty you
can swallow.” In that ambiguity between independence and sovereignty was planted seeds of
confusion that continue to haunt Russian federalism. Independence and sovereignty, of course,
are not the same thing, especially in the context
of a federal system. But operating within the
defective federal shell of the Soviet Union, the
difference went unnoticed for awhile.
This student would have observed how that
speech unleashed a torrent of declarations of sovereignty from the regions. These declarations—
although of no legal significance—had real repercussions. Some regions paid taxes, delivered
conscripts, and enforced federal law while other
regions did not, seemingly with impunity. As
different regions took different views of what
their sovereign status meant, this affected the
negotiation of the first Federal Treaty and the
1993 Constitution that ultimately repudiated
the more decentralized bargain that that treaty
had struck. Some regions felt betrayed by the
rejection of a treaty that they felt had established
the foundations of a new relationship with
Moscow. One region actually sought to secede.
And more than half negotiated special bilateral
relations with Moscow that established varying
degrees of fidelity to the constitutional division
of powers and subject-matter jurisdiction. The
legal status of these early bilateral treaties was as
shaky as that of the declarations of sovereignty
that preceded them. Some of them were signed
in secret, none of them were ratified by legislatures at any level.
None of this, of course, was immediately obvious or predictable from a facial assessment of
constitutional text. Federal structure could create
power, and create limits on power, as important
as more easily identified textual commands.
History, too, could inform how both textual
and structural constitutional claims should be
assessed. Such constitutional glosses are common, especially in systems of government as
complicated as federal systems.
But that was years ago. What if the same
bright Oxford student were to write on the same
examination question today? The essay would
look very different. She would probably not linger very long with the text of the Constitution
before describing a succession of federal statutes,

especially those passed at the start of Vladimir
Putin’s first term as president. As you know,
these federal laws and presidential decrees ended
the bilateral treaty process. One statute ousted
regional governors and parliamentary chairmen
as ex officio members of the upper chamber of the
Federal Assembly, the Council of the Federation.
By decree, federal districts were created that
broadly overlapped existing military districts.
Federal overseers, men who were mostly of high
military rank, were appointed by President Putin.
Another statute gave the federal president powers to dismiss regional executives, regional legislatures and municipal governments. In addition,
President Putin acquired the statutory power to
appoint regional executives himself (thus ending
all direct elections for heads of regional governments throughout the Federation). Other than
the federal president, the only remaining executive officials subject to direct, popular election
are mayors.
Even more recent legislation has ended direct representation of single-mandate constituencies in the lower chamber, the State Duma.
The cumulative result, therefore, is that every
region of Russia now has a chief executive
nominated by the federal president and removable by him, and no region of Russia has any
direct representative to the Federal Assembly
with anything remotely similar to an electoral
constituency in that region. That shift from political accountability to the people—whom the
Constitution repeatedly describes as the bearers
of sovereignty and the single source of power in
Russia—has deprived the Russian Federation of
one of the core protections in a federal system
against over-centralization: the political process. There exists what Associate Justice David
Souter of the United States Supreme Court referred to as “the political component of federalism.” In words that referenced the “founding
fathers” of the American federal republic, but
which sound eerily prescient for a Russia then
flush with petro-dollars, he underlined how
important this was for a federal system. Politics,
he wrote, “should mediate between state and
national interests as the strength and legislative
jurisdiction of the National Government inevitably increased through the expected growth of
the national economy.”
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The student may well have described these
measures as part of the swing of a pendulum, a
reaction to the extreme weakness of the federal
center under Yeltsin and increasing legal confusion caused by his parade of bilateral treaties
and agreements. The student would also now
have plenty of federal Constitutional Court
opinions to evaluate. He or she would have
noted the Court’s early ambivalence about issuing rulings about federal-regional relations,
the inconsistency of its early opinions and their
low rate of compliance under Yeltsin, followed
by the Court’s more aggressive enforcement of
President Putin’s so-called federal reforms. The
student would note that what had been achieved
was not solely a function of constitutional text,
but owed much to political forces and to the
unhappy memory of the 1990s. The text of the
Constitution was sufficiently vague to permit
an extraordinary shift of power between the
regions and the federal government without
any significant amendment at all. But this shift
was accomplished by devaluing structural constraints on that text placed on it by core principles of federalism.
In my book, which was published in 2002,
I observed the start of this swing of the pendulum during Putin’s first few years in office. I
forecast that this malleable constitution, on its
own, would no more stop extreme centralization under President Putin than it had stopped
the extreme decentralization of federal-regional
relations under President Yeltsin. At least part of
what was required was the strengthening of federal and regional institutions to ensure that federal and regional powers respected the spheres
of authority of each, and a strong, independent
Constitutional Court that could interpret the
Constitution with integrity and fidelity to both
the text and the structural principles embedded
in that document. The likelihood that even this
wish list would suffice, however, was undermined by the failure of federal and regional political elites to come to a consensus about exactly what those structural principles actually were
and in what foundational document they were
to be found. Vladimir Putin’s so-called dictatorship of law had certainly ended the parade
of declarations and bilateral treaties launched by
Yeltsin’s famous call to “take all the sovereignty
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you can swallow.” But it had not, indeed could
not have had the intention of resolving the underlying philosophical differences between federal and regional elites: Was this a federation
based on a constitution or a treaty? Was this a
federation in which the regions were granted
their governing authority by a supremely sovereign Moscow? Or was it Moscow that derived
its limited powers from regions that had ceded
some, but not all, of their sovereignty to the
center? In other words, Russia did not adopt a
federal system based on an agreed foundation of
the most basic principles of federalism.
The inherent attraction of federalism
is that, to borrow a phrase from Associate
Justice Anthony Kennedy of the United States
Supreme Court, federalism “split the atom of
sovereignty.” That idea unleashes opportunities
for spectacular innovation, generates dynamos
for economic progress, and establishes overlapping forums for democratic self-government. It
creates economies of scale and a whole much
greater than the sum of its parts. Federalism
creates multiple sources of sovereignty within a
single state, endowing or preserving each sovereign entity with spheres of authority that are
simultaneously co-ordinate and independent.
The regional and federal governments are dependent on one another, and yet each possesses
jurisdictions constitutionally protected against
intrusion by the other.
This division of sovereignty has another advantage, particularly important for Russia. As
Associate Justice Sandra Day O’Connor noted:
“Federalism secures to citizens the liberties that
derive from the diffusion of sovereign power.”
Put another way, also in O’Connor’s words, “A
healthy balance of power between the States
and the Federal Government will reduce the
risk of tyranny and abuse from either front.” In
the structure of federalism is thus a protection
of individual rights that can be more potent
than their mere identification in a list. In other
words, text alone does not protect liberty, constitutional structures do, too.
Those structures are almost gone in Russia.
At the request of the International Academy
of Comparative Law, I wrote a report last fall
(co-authored with Alexei Trochev and Nikolay
Balayan) on the unification of law in the Russian

Federation. I presented our findings in Mexico
City four months ago, as part of a larger project that compared the unification of law in 23
federal systems worldwide. The conclusions of
both our national report and the general report
are startling when considered in Russia’s historical perspective. Compared to other federal
systems, Russia’s legal system is among the most
unified in the world. It is almost certainly the
most centralized system in the world that still
claims to be federal.
The text of the Constitution identifies eighteen subjects over which jurisdiction is allocated to the central government. Fourteen
subjects are allocated to the joint authority of
the central government and regions. Subjects
not specifically allocated are left to the regions.
Notwithstanding this division, all of these subject areas are, for all practical purposes, under
the control of the central government to the
degree that it desires to exercise such control.
The default rule in Russia is that that question—what is inherently local in nature—is a
question for the central government alone to
decide. Therefore, all laws and normative legal
acts of the regions in areas of joint jurisdiction
must be issued in accordance with the federal
law on the issue. The Constitutional Court has
upheld the central government’s view that in
areas of joint authority, the central government
takes the leading role in establishing the space
left for local law-making, even when that space
is a null set. No historical or structural gloss appears to temper this engorgement of power.
Federal law often operates throughout Russia
directly, unmediated by regional law. Thus, the
law of contracts, torts, property, business organizations, and other aspects of private and
commercial law (subjects that other federal systems may leave to the jurisdiction of the component states) are all governed exclusively by
federal law. Through a system of codification,
the central government regulates all civil law,
civil procedure, criminal law, criminal procedure, administrative law and procedure, and
the procedure for use in the commercial courts.
There are federal codes governing the use of
land, air, water, and forests. Federal codes also
govern all labor law and family law. There are
codes for the citing and construction of towns,

housing, collection of taxes and customs duties, and the regulation of government budgets.
Even the form of government within the region
is not the exclusive prerogative of that region.
My colleagues and I were hard pressed to identify meaningful spheres of jurisdiction within
the exclusive sovereign power of the subjects of
the federation. With the exception of certain
limited controls over linguistic and cultural
practices, these do not appear to exist. From
the point of view of federalism, this is a terrible state of affairs. As then-United States Chief
Justice William Rehnquist observed, a federal
constitution “requires a distinction between
what is truly national and what is truly local.”
The current relationship between Moscow
and the regions is a relationship that I am no
longer certain may be described as federal in
any meaningful sense of that word. It lacks
now many of the structural features of federalism that I have identified: a division of sovereignty in which each entity is simultaneously
co-ordinate and independent; a political component that protects this division between what
is truly national and what is truly local; and
an understanding that in dividing power both
horizontally and vertically there is a structural
protection for individual rights that manifests
itself as much in regional legal distinctions as in
autonomy. Russia today presents an example of
what can happen when constitutional text is interpreted in a vacuum, with too little attention
to identifying these foundational principles, and
little attempt to make structural and historical
arguments to interpret constitutional text with
fidelity to those principles. Arguments and conclusions drawn from constitutional structure
and history are as valid and as important tools
of constitutional interpretation as argument
from the plain meaning of the text. Indeed,
structure and history stabilize a text and prevent the sort of pendulum swings that we have
seen in Russia. But these tools—as important
to a legislature as to a judiciary—have not been
used in Russia. And the longer they go unused,
the more difficult their use will become. Let
me give you one example.
In December 2005, the Constitutional Court
upheld the constitutionality of President Putin’s
new power to nominate governors for regional
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confirmation, thus ending their direct election.
Will Pomeranz has written an excellent analysis
of this case that you will soon be able to read in
Demokratizatsiya, but let me briefly note some of
the opinion’s features and omissions. The Court
noted the variety of direct and indirect ways
that the Constitution provided for filling federal executive and representative offices: some
elected, some ex officio, some textually proscribed, others left to be established by statute.
“Thus,” the Court concluded, “the possibility
of different variants of endowing with authority organs and offices of public power, which
are not directly named in the Constitution of
the Russian Federation as elected,” leaves open
the possibility of change as to how to fill these
positions. The Court concluded that if the text
is silent, this alteration is constitutional.
But the Court never mentions provisions
of the Constitution that support the broader
structural protections of federalism against the
drumbeat of a unified executive. For example,
the Court concludes that regional executives
are “links” in the chain of a “unified system
of state power”. Thus, regional executives, it
says “stand in relations of subordination directly to the President of the Russian Federation”
based on the latter’s direct, nationwide popular
election. But this interpretation would render
Article 85 of the Constitution meaningless,
since this article limits the President’s powers
to resolve differences between federal and regional organs of state power to that of “conciliatory procedures.” Such a limitation would be
strange indeed if regional executives were mere
subordinates of the federal president.
This manner of reasoning—deriving permitted avenues of organizing state power from
the absence of textual restrictions—is to recast
a constitution as a mere code. But the plain
meaning of the text, or the absence of any text,
is not the only source of constitutional authority. The structure of the Constitution establishes
prohibitions as forcefully as the text can. The
federal structure and recent history of Russia
provide strong arguments against such a reading of the text.
I have already mentioned the political component of federalism and the need for genuine
distinctions between what is truly national and
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what is truly local. Federalism, although found
in many variations in many countries, does
have a certain base meaning. There is more to
a written constitution than the plain meaning
of its text. And yet the Constitutional Court of
the Russian Federation has found it relatively
easy to subordinate those principles to the principle of the “unity of the system of state power”
in Articles 5 and 77 of the Constitution. That
phrase would seem to be best understood as
limited by federal principles rather than as placing a limit on federal principles. Read in the
context of a federal constitution, that language
does not necessarily lead one to support the idea
of an “executive vertical.”
In conclusion, let me say this. You will have
noticed that I have flecked my remarks with
quotations from justices on the United States
Supreme Court. I did this deliberately, perhaps unduly provocatively, but not to suggest
that American federalism is a model for anyone
to follow. American federalism is probably the
worst possible approach for Russia or any other
multi-national, multi-ethnic, or multi-lingual
country. These justices are not talking about
American federalism, they are talking about
principles of federalism in the abstract. These
principles include: that there be a meaningful distinction between what is truly national
and what is truly local; a political component
of federalism that creates multiple levels of direct political accountability; that power is sufficiently diffused to protect individual liberty
from attack by either local or national powers.
What is more, these justices made these
arguments not by looking to the text of an
American document, but by looking at the
structures that a federal constitution creates.
The word “federal”, after all, is not to be found
anywhere in the text of the U.S. Constitution.
Each quotation is from a case decided in the last
fifteen years (i.e. during the new era of federalism that it was hoped the Russian Constitution
had introduced). The Russian Constitution
has been interpreted with insufficient attention to these principles of federalism, principles
derived as much from its structure as from its
unique recent history as from its text. Instead,
the Constitution’s text has too often been overprivileged and read in a vacuum to render in-

terpretations that are ahistorical and contrary to
the structures of the federal state that it purports to create.
The Oxford exam I mentioned at the start of
my remarks included more than one opportunity for the student to discuss Russian federalism.
The very next question on that exam provided
a quotation from the great Dutch scholar of
Soviet and Russian law, Ferdinand Feldbrugge,
who rightly concluded: “The Soviet Union was
a unitary state which masqueraded as a federation.” The student was asked whether he agreed
with this assessment and whether things in
Russia were now different. The able student in
1995 might have pointed to the disparity between formal Soviet structures and actual practice to draw conclusions about that entity, but
accept the invitation of the question to advance
a more optimistic view based on the text of the
new Constitution.
There is little reason for optimism about
federalism in Russia in the near term unless,
like Mikhail Gorbachev in his time, Dmitry
Medvedev should surprise us in his. The
Constitution has thus far escaped substantial amendment by way of Chapter 9 of the
Constitution. And yet, in the short span of fifteen years its federal structure has been almost
completely undone. That is a bad sign. Worse
than a constitution that is buried under the
weight of constant amendment is a constitution
that, in the face of systemic institutional change,
need not be amended much at all. Thank you.
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